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Abstract
How do we understand the broad history to which we belong? What meaning do we
give to it and what role does it have in our lives? This paper proposes to approach
collective memory from the perspective of the subject, adopting a developmental per-
spective to explore how people build specific relations and representations of the
historical past. Building on the literature on collective remembering and on life-course
studies, it conceptualises memory an as oriented, culturally mediated and dialogical
action with a developmental history, embodied in ‘trajectories of remembering’. This
conception is applied to the life trajectory of Alain, a 44-year-old Belgian journalist, with
a particular interest in the social and intersubjective dimensions of collective remem-
bering. From this analysis, it will be concluded that people’s relation to history is the
product of the different positions they assume through time. The study of these suc-
cessive experiences and their integration can thus shed new lights on how we relate to
history and give it meaning.
Keywords
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Introduction
When Milgram (1974) designed his famous experiment on obedience to authority,
he clearly had in mind the events of Second World War. He was trying to under-
stand how such atrocities happened, and his research led him to the conclusion that
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which should be used for any reference to this work
it was not the ‘nature’ of the German people at the time that made them possible,
but the authoritarian aspects of the regime they were living in. His theory has since
been much criticised, with for instance Reicher’s (Reicher, Haslam, & Rath, 2008)
study showing how the ambient discourses led people to believe they were acting
for the greater good, and not just under the pressure of authority. However, the
same assumption underlies both studies: if we can learn from what happened in
history, maybe we can make sure it will not be repeated in the future. Or, in the
words of common sense: ‘those who do not learn from history are doomed to
repeat it’. Nonetheless, research on the memory of the collective past has tended
to show that we actually do the contrary: we use references to history to defend
identity projects, we are quite insensitive to facts, we tend to reduce it to a single-
minded story where what matters are the intentions of the actors and we often use
it to make our diﬀerences with others ‘essential’ to who we are (Raudsepp &
Wagner, 2012; Wertsch & Batiashvili, 2012). How to understand, then, the discrep-
ancy between these uses of collective memory?
So far, collective memory has mainly been explored through a social or socio-
logical lens, focusing on the role of culture and society in shaping what we say
about our collective past. By doing so, it has proved a useful tool to study how
groups remember and mobilise the past, especially in times of conﬂict (e.g.,
Wertsch & Batiashvili, 2012) or when their identity becomes problematic or threa-
tened (e.g., Hammack, 2010). It has, however, also painted a biased picture of how
we relate to history, as it has primarily focused on how it is mobilised by societies
facing a troubling past or a troubling present (de Saint-Laurent, 2017). Little atten-
tion has been given to the person who remembers and how unique understandings of
history are forged. Adding such a psychological perspective to the study of collective
memory could help us understand how some accounts of the past may be one-sided
and encourage conﬂict while others may foster reﬂection and open up new possibi-
lities for the future. In this paper, I propose to adopt such a perspective, looking at
the developmental trajectory of our relations to history. In a ﬁrst section, I will draft
what may be gained from this approach and summarise previous studies’ ﬁndings.
Based on these, I will propose to investigate further the role of interactions with
signiﬁcant others through a Life Positioning Analysis (LPA; Martin, 2013). In a
second section, I will apply this method to the life story of Alain, a 44-year-old
journalist in Belgium. This will lead me to conclude that collective memory is pro-
duced by diﬀerent yet complementary social positions that may be experienced
through the life-course, and it is by giving them meaning and integrating them in
unique ways that relations to history are forged. The aim of this paper is therefore to
propose a new perspective on collective memory, centred on the person as she moves
through life and society, and to illustrate it with a case study.
Collective remembering
How can we adopt a psychological perspective on collective memory, focusing on
the person who remembers, and yet not lose sight of the important social and
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cultural aspects highlighted in the literature? One way to do this is to adopt a
sociocultural and developmental perspective, as it has been done in life-course
studies (Zittoun, 2012). On the one hand, looking at the development of a psycho-
logical function is a highly eﬃcient way to reintroduce the individual in psychology
(Zittoun, 2006). On the other hand, sociocultural approaches to psychology have
placed culture and social interactions at the centre of human development
(Valsiner, 1987). I thus propose to investigate people’s trajectories of remembering
and how they may forge their (unique) discourses on the historical past. To do so, I
will ﬁrst summarise the main ﬁndings of sociocultural approaches to memory, and
especially collective memory, to then introduce what a life-course perspective
entails and an integrative model.
The main contribution of sociocultural psychology to the study of collective
memory has been to conceptualise it as an action – collective remembering –
rather than as a static and more or less accurate representation of what happened
(Wertsch, 2002). Indeed, most of the mainstream literature on collective memory
has focused on how the past is ‘stored’ in the mind to be later retrieved (Danziger,
2008), modelling memory as an archive (Brockmeier, 2010) where souvenirs remain
unchanged except by the deteriorating power of time. Sociocultural approaches, on
the contrary, have proposed to understand collective memory as a reconstruction
of the past, following the pioneer work of Frederic Bartlett (1995). In fact,
Bartlett’s most important insight was to focus on the adaptive nature of memory
rather than on its fallibility. He theorised its main function as oriented towards the
present – it allows us to adapt past action to the present situation – making accur-
ate reproductions of the past irrelevant in everyday life (but see Brown & Reavey,
2017, for an interesting discusion of this idea).
Sociocultural approaches have also investigated the role of cultural tools in
constructing accounts of past. In particular, they have explored the prominent
role of cultural narratives in shaping discourses on history (e.g. Bresco´ de Luna,
2009; Brockmeier, 2002; Liu & Hilton, 2005; Wertsch, 2008). Wertsch, for instance,
conceptualised collective memory as an action mediated by the use of cultural
tools, which include oﬃcial text and stories told about history as well as narrative
templates that illustrate how stories are to be told in a speciﬁc cultural context
(Wertsch, 2002, 2008). This model stemmed from the works of Lev Vygotsky, who
posited that all human activities are mediated by the use of cultural tools and/or
signs (Vygotsky, 1978). Vygotsky also argued that they exist in a triangular relation
including self and others, through which such tools and signs come to be mastered
(Vygotsky & Luria, 1994). Human cognition, thus, is dialogical in nature
(Fernyhough, 2008), that is, it is fundamentally oriented towards the other
(Linell, 2009). Some sociocultural approaches to collective memory have thus
focused on the dialogical aspects of memory, looking at how stories told about
the past are deeply related to what others say about history (de Saint-Laurent,
2014). The sociocultural approach to collective memory is summarised in
Figure 1, which presents this phenomenon as a dialogical, culturally mediated
and oriented action.
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The above model oﬀers an interesting entry into the processes by which the past
is reconstructed, from a psychological perspective. It does, however, present
memory as an ‘amnesic’ phenomenon, where the person who remembers is inter-
changeable with any other because she is deprived of the past that makes her who
she is. In other words, by presenting memory as an atemporal function, it discon-
nects it from the subject who does the remembering.
Trajectories of remembering
In order to put the psychological subject back at the centre of memory processes,
and yet not loose sight of their social and cultural dimensions, I propose to adopt a
sociocultural developmental perspective on collective remembering (see also de
Saint-Laurent, in press; de Saint-Laurent & Zittoun, in press). Such a perspective
recognises that human life takes place in irreversible time (Valsiner, 1994), creating
unique trajectories (Zittoun et al., 2013) that can account for how we relate to the
world and give it meaning (Zittoun, 2006, 2008, 2012). Across the course of our life,
we become familiarised with diﬀerent values and systems of meanings or draw
generalisations from our experiences. These may be internalised – although they
are often resisted too – and given a personal meaning through life experiences
(for an example, see de Saint-Laurent, in press).
New meanings and values are more likely to emerge in times of rupture and
transitions, when ‘the obvious suddenly comes into question’ (Zittoun, 2006, p.
6) and they are thus the privileged ‘unit of analysis for studying psychological
change’ (Zittoun, 2006, p. 2). In this context, culturally shared elements such as
stories or systems of values can become symbolic resources to make sense of the
situation at hand (Zittoun, 2006; Zittoun, Duveen, Gillespie, Ivinson, & Psaltis,
2003). If new meanings are produced, the rupture may in turn lead to transi-
tions, characterised by intransitive qualitative changes (Zittoun, 2012). Ruptures
are subjectively experienced by the person, although they are often associated
with socially marked events (entering school, starting to work, marriages,
divorces, etc.).
Self Other 
Tools and signs 
Action 
Figure 1. Collective memory as oriented, culturally mediated and dialogical action
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Thus, the notion of trajectories used in this paper does not refer to the objective
track outlined by socially recognised milestones (e.g., graduating from school,
getting married, retiring) or periods of life (e.g., adolescence, adulthood), but to
the subjective path constructed by the interaction between the discourses of the self
and the unfolding course of one’s life (de Saint-Laurent, in press). As such, a
trajectory is not static – new ruptures always have the potential to lead to the re-
evaluation of the signiﬁcance of this or that event – but is, in a given context, the
most meaningful way to explain where one stands today. Transitions and the rup-
tures that provoke them can be more or less general (Zittoun, 2006): they can
concern central aspects of one’s life (starting a new job, losing a partner, becoming
a parent. . .) or be quite peripheral (developing a new hobby, changing one’s under-
standing of an event by learning new facts, breaking a friendship. . .). Clearly, one’s
relation to history falls, most of the time, in the second category. However, what
‘counts’ as peripheral or central will depend on the person and her circumstances:
changing jobs, for someone who does not care much about this aspect of their life,
might be less important than discovering new information about the wrongdoings
of one’s family during Second World War, for instance.
Is it possible, then, to consider discourses on history as the product of a devel-
opmental trajectory, as forged through the ruptures and transitions one experiences
in life? What would be the consequences of such an approach? A proposition of a
model is presented in Figure 2 (see also de Saint-Laurent & Zittoun, in press, for a
full presentation), and it tries to bring together the literature on collective remem-
bering and life-course studies. It conceptualises collective memory as an oriented
action done in interaction with others and mediated by cultural resources, with
both a developmental history for the person who remembers (past recalls) and a
speciﬁc location in her life-course (place of the central triangle in irreversible time).
Past recalls
Self
Tools and sig
ori
Ot
ns
Action 
entation
her
Figure 2. Collective memory as a developmental process with socially located self, in inter-
action with a socially located other, using cultural resources (adapted from de Saint-Laurent &
Zittoun, in press).
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Understanding discourses on history, then, entails understanding how they
transform over time (developing from the ‘past recalls’ triangle) and what they
subsequently allow the person to do (the ‘action orientation’ triangle), that is,
the person’s trajectory of remembering. These are best studied, as life-course studies
have shown, by focusing on the ruptures and transitions in one’s relation to the
past. However, this model does not just extend in time but also across social and
cultural dimensions. Thus, changes in these dimensions should be given particular
attention, for example, new interlocutors, access to novel information, develop-
ment of alternative social positions for the self, mastery of diﬀerent narrative
frames, emergence of new concepts and understandings of history, etc.
This model has been applied in previous – albeit limited – research (de Saint-
Laurent, in press; de Saint-Laurent & Zittoun, in press; see also Bauer & Gaskell,
1999 for the original Toblerone model). This research has highlighted the need to
unpack further one important dimension of the model: the relation self-other and
its evolution over time. The importance of this dimension is double. First, from a
sociocultural and developmental perspective, and to paraphrase Vygotsky, the path
from the self to the tools and signs one uses passes through the other (Vygotsky &
Luria, 1994). In other words, the resources one uses to talk about history – from
the historical facts presented to the narrative frames used to organise and interpret
them – are ﬁrst introduced by others and used with others. Thus, studying the
relationships through which people have discovered history oﬀers the possibility to
understand which resources, information, values and representations are available
to them and what importance they may give to them. Second, from a collective
memory perspective, and as has been seen above in this paper, it is important to
understand to which social groups people belong. However, group memberships
are multiple, subjective, dynamic and historical (Gillespie, Howarth, & Cornish,
2012), and a single categorisation is both impossible and unable to shed light on
people’s speciﬁc relations to the past. Focusing on how people socially position
themselves vis-a`-vis others, throughout the life-course, allows us to account for the
fact that group memberships evolve through time, are always multiple, and to
study how these are navigated to create unique yet coherent understandings of
the historical past. Indeed, if we use culturally constrained narrative frames and
defend socially sanctioned versions of the past, alternatives are always available (de
Saint-Laurent, 2014), both within and between groups. A life-course perspective on
the self-other relations through which historical representations are forged may
thus shed new lights on how collective memory can at times produce extremely
reﬂexive accounts of the past and in others by the justiﬁcation for violent conﬂicts
and nationalisms.
This is what I propose to do in this paper, with the means of LPA (Martin,
2013). It stems from Position Exchange Theory (Gillespie & Martin, 2014; Martin,
2013), a theory that considers both the ontogenetic and phylogenetic development
of self and intersubjective action to be made possible by position exchange – actual
or symbolic – and the integration of positions. For instance, it is by successively
experiencing being taken care of (by one’s parents) and taking care of (symbolically
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by playing with dolls), that children learn to take the perspective of their parents,
albeit in a limited manner at ﬁrst, and to look at themselves from this perspective.
It is also through the integration of these positions that ‘caring’ becomes a signiﬁ-
cant symbol (Gillespie, 2005, 2006), integration that will continue throughout the
life-course (for instance, when one experiences becoming a parent). LPA thus
focuses on the diﬀerent social positions one comes to occupy in life, their evolutions
and the relations between them. Because social positions are relational, they cap-
ture quite well the dynamic between self and other, and because LPA is interested
in their evolution across time, it ﬁts well with a life-course approach.
By using LPA to investigate people’s trajectories of remembering, my aim is
to answer the following questions: (1) what are the diﬀerent positions one comes
to assume in front of collective memory; (2) how do these relate to the positions of
others and (3) in what way can their evolution in time shed light on how the person
understands the past?
Data and method
In order to explore people’s relation to history, nine interviews were conducted in
Belgium and in Switzerland in February and March 2014 and June 2015.
Participants were recruited around a theatre play (spectators and production
team) on the Israel-Palestine conﬂict by Adeline Rosenstein (2014). The play pre-
sents a unique, historical and polyphonic perspective on the conﬂict and thus is of
double interest for this research. First, this was an opportunity to recruit partici-
pants who were interested in the topic, comfortable talking about it (likely to be
made more knowledgeable on historical issues by participating in these kinds of
events) and had had experienced changes in their relation to history (at the very
least because the play in itself had the potential to cause a (micro)rupture in
people’s understanding of history). Second, the complex yet critical nature of
the play landed itself to multiple interpretations and thus could be used to
investigate how diﬀerent people gave it diﬀerent meanings. Most of the participants
were members of the audience (seven), and the rest were part of the team around
the play.
Each interview lasted between approximately 45 and 90 minutes, and the ques-
tions were open ended. Their aim was to explore the participants’ relation to his-
tory and its development over time. In practice, it means that participants were
asked which historical events were important to them, how they had become so,
what resources they used to understand these events, with whom they talked about
history, and any changes they may have experienced because of this. They were also
asked how they thought history should be taught to children in practice – in an
attempt to encourage overly general or ambivalent participants to position them-
selves – and what was for them the ‘direction’ of history, if any – to push, on the
contrary, overly particular interviewees to produce generalisations. Follow-up
questions were guided by the theoretical model (especially when asking about
past recall, potential tools and interlocutors) or by my own desire to obtain
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more information about the events to which the participants were referring.1 This
meant, on a few occasions, venturing quite far from the topic at hand, particularly
when the participants’ relation to history seemed linked to other aspects of their
lives (e.g., a broader vision of politics, religious beliefs.). The interviews were all
conducted in French, which was the mother tongue of most of the participants, and
in ‘relaxed’ settings (cafe´, participant’s garden, etc.), except for one interview con-
ducted through Skype.
The interviews did not follow a chronological order – going from the partici-
pant’s ﬁrst relation to history and then moving all the way to the present – because
it was assumed that most people would not have any experience in narrating such a
trajectory. The questions were simply organised to facilitate the task of the
interviewee. I then used a narrative and trajectory analysis (Rosenthal, 1993): the
interviews were divided in sections corresponding to diﬀerent periods of life and
then re-ordered chronologically to create a ‘reconstructed’ trajectory. After this, a
LPA (Martin, 2013), adapted to the model presented in Figure 2, was carried out.
It focused, for each period, on (1) the ruptures experienced, (2) the positions
adopted, (3) the interactions with others, (4) the resources used, (5) the outcomes
of the transition and (6) the broader qualitative changes to which these may have
led. In the following, I will present one example of a trajectory with the case study
of Alain.2 He was chosen because his trajectory is both complex – and thus it
illustrates dynamics found in many separate interviews – and he is very explicit
about his relation to history, making of him an exemplary case.
Case study: Alain
Alain is a 44-year-old journalist, who was born and grew up in Belgium. He comes
from a family with very limited education – his parents did not ﬁnish school –
where people do not talk about history. As an adolescent, he is sent to a strict
catholic school, known for the high level of its students and the diﬃculty of its
examinations. And he explains, after I ask him how it was: I remember an espe-
cially scary history exam. I would say it was more, well, encyclopaedic. It was not
polemical at all. Well, it was in a way because ignoring polemical aspects of the
debate is polemical.
Here, Alain is put in the position of an ignorant learner, who has to repeat the
‘truth’ told by the knowledgeable professor. History does not have a personal
meaning, but it is the factual, cold past found in encyclopaedias and needs to be
learnt by heart. However, a ﬁrst rupture occurs when he turns 18 and starts uni-
versity. Indeed, when I ask him what changed his relation to history after adoles-
cence, he replies:
I started university in 1989. . .3 So it was the fall of the wall, you see. . . When you enter
university, in political science in 1989, you ﬁnd yourself, well, in one of the richest
intellectual period. . . And a positive one. I mean you were not born. . . in 1940, you
see. . . It’s quite the opposite. . . So yes, it was a turning point. Because all my
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childhood had been cradled by the Soviet Union. . . by the cold war, by the iron
curtain, by these countries that we watch from the afar and look retrograde and
scary and threatening. . . I am actually the opposite of my father, if you want, or
my parents’ generation. I mean, me, my dad did his military service in Cold War
Germany. . . in 1963. . . when the Cold War was getting really strong. . . And me, I
become of age and I don’t do a military service. . . because I was in the ﬁrst generation
in Belgium. . . liberated from it. So conversely to my dad. . . well, the historical para-
digm changed. I mean, you are 18, at university watching the wall fall and my dad. . . I
mean he is 18, in his uniform, watching the wall.
The fall of the Berlin wall and wider societal changes it led to act here as a trigger,
as the rupture from the previous period ‘cradled by the Soviet Union’. By using the
stories his father told him as a resource, as a point of comparison, he makes both of
them enter history. Indeed, until then his father’s past was just a story (as Alain
said clearly in the interview, his parents did not talk to him about history as a child,
and yet he knows this part of his father’s life), but it is the stark contrast between
the two men that gives the moment a historical dimension. Or, as Alain powerfully
says: ‘you are 18, at university watching the wall fall and my dad. . . I mean he is 18,
in his uniform, watching the wall’. He experiences a new position: he is a witness of
history as it unfolds, in front of a father who was oppressed by it. The result of this
transition is that Alain starts travelling around eastern Europe: he decides to go
discover these countries on the other side of the iron curtain and goes to witness
their historical change. And he says:
It went all so fast. And all of the sudden we all wanted to go there. . . So I took
Russian classes. . . and I went to the Baltic States in 94. . . and Romania in 1995.
And it was terrifying. . . the poverty. . . And people at the time, I remember a young
guy in the mountains who was saying: you in Europe you’re not doing a thing for us
and all, and I said wait, one day you’ll be part of the EU and he said no, it’s not
possible. And I’m very happy now they are part of it. So I was right.
. . . And people were starting to talk a lot about the communist years and all. . . and
make jokes about it. . . I don’t remember a speciﬁc one, but I remember people were
doing it a lot at the table.
We can see in this excerpt the prolongation of the change started in 1989, where
Alain positions himself as a witness of history. However, several diﬀerences can be
noted here. If his father disappears from the story, new protagonists emerge. In the
background, we can guess the presence of Alain’s university colleagues (‘we all
wanted to go there’). He also starts interacting with people during his travels,
who tell him stories about their version of history, the ‘communist years’.
However, these voices can be interpreted more as resources to understand a past
he did not experience than full interlocutors with whom the past is debated: he
remembers them talking and joking about history, but mainly among themselves.
This interpretation is also based on the way Alain positions himself in the excerpt:
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as a privileged witness of post-communist history. And, in this sense, the popula-
tions he interacts with are closer to the position of his father than to his, as they are
considered oppressed by history. His position of ‘privileged witness’ is especially
salient when he talks about meeting a young Romanian in the mountains: he sees
so much what is going on that he can accurately ‘predict’ what will happen next
more than the locals themselves.
When I ask him what changed next, he replies:
There is no real turning point [after that]. . . but maybe it was when I discovered
Edward Said when I was. . . a student in Cambridge. . . We were very much on orien-
talism, on questions about inventions, imagination. . . for political usages. Maybe it
was stronger in the UK than here [in Belgium]. . . And, evidently. . . when you are
interested in this post-soviet universe. . . you have all of history to rewrite, because it
was essentially a propaganda regime. . . For academics like us, everything was to be re-
discovered. . . And Edward Said is a guy that really helped me in that.
Although Alain starts this excerpt by denying that there was any turning point after
the rupture that 1989 was, what he says just after clearly shows that a change did
occur here. Discovering Edward Said – and, he later says, Foucault – may not
indeed be a rupture, but actually a new resource to help him make sense of the
collapse of the Soviet Union and the events that followed it. This new resource, in
the form of historical concepts (‘orientalism’ and, although he does not specify it,
probably Foucault’s genealogism) seems to provoke two major changes from the
previous period. First, Alain realises that history is something that is written by
people with speciﬁc political agendas and thus that it can be re-written, for
instance, by people like him. Second, it turns history into something that is debat-
able with others (‘we were very much on Orientalism. . .’) in particular intellectual
contexts (‘maybe it was stronger in the UK than here’). Interestingly, the position
Alain gives himself (‘academics like us’) is actually an anticipation of what comes
next (he did not become an academic until after Cambridge). It may, however,
reﬂect how this perspective was made possible by what he experienced there. When
he, later on, does start his academic career, he explains:
What interested me at the time was to see how universities bore responsibilities in. . .
the creation of conﬂicts, in the development of nationalist ideas. . . as was the case in
Caucasus. . .
[So] then I travelled. I went to universities, I went to the American University in
Beirut. . . to see for instance. . . how their stories, you see for instance the Maronites
saying that they are not Arabs but Phoenicians. . . There is always this historical
reﬂex. . . a bit everywhere. And I mean it’s typically a very academic construction. . .
to say yes but us we are not like the others. . . You see the others, there, the Shiites and
all, it’s not us. . . Us, we are Lebanese because we are the heirs of the Phoenicians. . .
and we have an ancestral history behind us, so all of the sudden we are worth much
more than others.
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Alain’s professional transition seems to have brought quite a few changes. If he
keeps interacting with fellow academics, it is not anymore as debate partners, but
as these others who write history in dangerous ways. He later insists on how these
are bad academics, from bad universities, and that not all are like that. It may be an
attempt to further distance himself from them, but might also be an eﬀort to show
to me, the academic who is interviewing him, that he does not paint all of us with
the same brush. To develop his position of ‘good’ academic, analysing how others
produce (dangerous) historical discourses, Alain uses two diﬀerent types of the
resources. First, he uses generalisations and concepts (and describes the situation
in Lebanon as ‘typical’, as something that is ‘always’ like that ‘everywhere’), similar
to what he did in the previous period with Said and Foucault. Second, he travels
and goes to discuss with locals, as he did after the fall of the Berlin wall. Thus, it
seems that in his academic career, Alain managed to integrate the resources and the
positions he developed during previous periods of his life: he is both the intellectual
capable of historical critic, thanks to the concepts he has come to master, and the
privileged witness, who travels to go experience history ﬁrst hand.
Alain does not report much change in his position in the years that follow. He
leaves academia and becomes UN consultant on the crisis he studied in his PhD,
when he worked on historical nomadism as a justiﬁcation for deportation in a
speciﬁc conﬂict.4 After a few years, he changes careers again, and he is now a
journalist specialised on the same topic. However, his perspective on history did
not change and becoming a journalist can be seen as the ‘ﬁnal’ integration of his
two positions: a reporter, between witness and analyst. And, when I ask him what
were his thoughts on the theatre play he saw before I recruited him to participate in
this research, he says:
I think that in terms of ideas we are on the same page. . . I was happy to meet people
who echo in some ways. . . things that are close to what we do and well, in an other
area of the world, but where I see they reﬂect on sedentarism, on indigenousity, on
roots and well, on deportations as well.
When asked what they thought of the play or what they saw in it, no other
participants referred to these dimensions (this includes more than the nine inter-
viewees of this speciﬁc project, as the play became part of a broader project, ‘Le
The´aˆtre de la Connaissance’, a year after this research was conducted). What
Alain saw in the complex and multivocal theatre production, then, appears to
be the result of his own, personal relation to history, forged through the dif-
ferent ruptures and transitions he experienced. And although not all participants
gave the play such a unique meaning, others who like him developed a rather
strong conception of history tended, too, to understand the play as defending a
view similar to theirs, or at least to present the Israel-Palestine conﬂict as
illustrating their views (see, for instance, de Saint-Laurent, in press, where a
participant adopting a rather communist perspective presents the situation as
linked to capitalist issues).
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Discussion
By reconstructing Alain’s trajectory, we have seen him move through a series of
diﬀerent positions: the passive recipient of history, the witness and then privileged
witness, the intellectual re-writing history, the critical scholar and ﬁnally the repor-
ter. Each position was enriched by the previous ones but also gave Alain a unique
perspective on history. Not only did he integrate, in the end, several perspectives,
but his ﬁnal position may also be seen as a reﬂection of where he started: who is the
audience he is seeking by being a journalist, if not the ignorant recipient of history,
like he used to be as a child? His trajectory, then, is not a linear progression, a
perpetual replacement of a perspective by a new one, but the expansion, along
social dimensions, of his understanding of how the past is built. The positions he
consecutively takes are also dependent on how others place themselves and interact
with him: to be the passive recipient of history, there needs to be someone trans-
mitting said history; to be a witness, there needs to be both actors to observe and a
future audience to whom one can testify; to be an intellectual re-writing history,
someone must have badly written it before; to be a critical scholar, a scientiﬁc
community to challenge must exist and, ﬁnally, to be a reporter requires both
someone to do something worth reporting and having someone to whom it can
be reported. The developmental trajectory of collective remembering, then, can be
interpreted as the successive discovery and experience of the multiple positions that
make talking about history possible.
What characterises Alain’s relation to history is not so much the social groups to
which he belongs at a given moment in time, but how he resolves (or not) the
tensions between the diﬀerent versions of history that are proposed to him by these
groups. This trend can be found throughout the data, and not only in the case of
Alain. Most participants (seven out of nine) reported being faced with contradic-
tions in the way they learnt history (often between school and home, but also
between family and friends, between diﬀerent family members, or because they
were told new stories as they grew older), and all proposed ‘composite’ accounts
of history, borrowing from the diﬀerent social groups they have been acquainted
with throughout their life. At times, it is done through a very conscious and reﬂex-
ive process, where participants explain having actively sought new meanings after
experiencing a rupture. At others, larger societal circumstances seem to constrain
very much what can be said or not. Similarly, some participants resolve the ten-
sions and contradictions they are subjected to by creating new meanings for history
(as Alain with ‘nomadism’), while others seek answers in existing ideologies (see de
Saint-Laurent, in press, for an example with communism).
Going back to the model proposed at the beginning of this paper (Figure 2), we
can say that diﬀerent positions oﬀer diﬀerent tools and aﬀord diﬀerent interpret-
ations of the past. For instance, when positioned as an academic, Alain adopts a
very critical reading of history based on concepts developed by preeminent intel-
lectual ﬁgures, and it is only later that he becomes wary about the ‘bad academics’
who rewrite history – an interpretation of the past less directly aﬀorded by the
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situation. It thus seems that the tools available to the person and the others with
whom one interacts both open up new possibilities to think about the past and
constrain them – opening the central triangle in the ﬁgure and yet delimitating it.
Through time, however, people discover new resources and explore multiple
positions, allowing them to go beyond the constraints of the present situation
(or, at times, increasing them further). What may produce reﬂexive accounts of
the historical past, then, in opposition to nationalistic ones, is the exposition to
both alternative versions of history and to resources allowing one to make sense of
the contradiction. In other words, opening new horizons (expanding the symbolic
space of the triangle in the ﬁgure) is productive insofar as one disposes of resources
that can frame the problem and give meaning to the situation.
Of course, the research presented here is limited, not only because it is based on
nine interviews but also because of the type of participants involved: mainly intel-
lectuals and artists with a speciﬁc interest in history (at least enough to go see a
theatre play on the topic). If this facilitated the study of how new positions may be
taken – most participants had travelled extensively, lived abroad at one point,
changed careers multiple times or experienced a high social mobility – it did so
within a very particular population. It may, thus, reﬂect dynamics that are speciﬁc
to them. However, self-other relations and position exchange are fundamental
psychosocial processes no matter what population is studied. But, if we have
seen here how Alain adopted diﬀerent positions, two central questions remain:
how are certain positions blocked and rejected, for we do not always welcome
the perspective of others? And how are these experiences of alterity mobilised to
produce new understandings of the past? Answering these questions, with the help
of a microgenetic method, will be the main purpose of the study following this
research (de Saint-Laurent, in preparation).
Conclusion
The aim of this paper has been to propose a sociocultural and developmental
model of collective memory and to apply it on a case study, with a speciﬁc focus
on the role of self-other relations. I hope to have demonstrated, with the analysis of
the trajectory of Alain, that such an approach can shed new lights on how
history is understood by people, in part because of the complex relation between
self and others in collective memory. This approach does not only have analyt-
ical consequences, however. From a theoretical perspective, it involves a shift
from theories focused on explaining how the image of the group is defended
through biased versions of the past – borrowing from research on stereotypes,
intergroup relations, social identity, etc. – to theories interested in social think-
ing, meaning making and perspective taking (de Saint-Laurent, submitted). At a
deeper level, it means moving away from theories that treat people as the pas-
sive recipients of representations imposed by the social group to which they
belong, and going towards theories able to grasp how people navigate complex
social environments and assume multiple identities that forge how they think
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about the world. The challenge, then, it is propose a model of collective
memory that accounts for both what is shared and what is unique in the
person’s relation to the past, and how collective dynamics and personal under-
standings co-constitute each other.
From a methodological perspective, the consequences are double. First, it
highlights the necessity to develop methods focusing on processes and interactions
– that is looking at how the person and her context evolve through time – instead of
content – that is mapping out what is said about the past and not so much how
these discourses are constructed. Second, it requires studying people and how they
conceive the world, instead of events and how they are perceived, as is usually done
in collective memory research. Although being able to grasp the public discourses
surrounding an event is a very interesting and relevant endeavour, the study of
collective memory cannot be limited to it.
Finally, this has important practical consequences. To go back to the original
question of this paper, how to understand both extremely reﬂexive and extre-
mely nationalist accounts of history? If I believe that the analysis of the case of
Alain oﬀers hints as to what the answer may be – that it depends on both the
sociocultural conditions of the person and the meaning she gives to them – the
real issue here is how we may encourage people to be more reﬂexive about
history and to resist the temptation to write a gloriﬁed ‘national novel’ (to
borrow an expression favoured by French politicians who wish to impose
such a version of the past). Conceiving collective memory as a representation
more or less imposed by the group means that not only reﬂexivity is impossible
– or limited to a very small intellectual elite of which the research is often
presented as being a member – but that the only form of education possible
is at best rote learning, at worst propaganda. In the end, then, understanding
how collective memory transforms through time and how people resist hege-
monic representations of the past is as much a societal as it is a theoretical
challenge.
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Notes
1. The level of details voluntarily given by participants varied widely, not least because of
the perceived nationality difference, as expressed explicitly by some of the participants.
The case study used in this paper focuses on an interviewee who grew up in Belgium and
probably assumed that I was Swiss because of my university affiliation. He was thus
usually quite explicit.
2. Names, places, occupations and any other information that could lead to the identifica-
tion of the participant were changed.
3. ‘. . .’ indicates that part of the transcript was removed to shorten the quotes, but without
altering their general meaning.
4. This is left voluntarily vague in order to preserve anonymity.
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